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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RENT
SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM-A STAFF VIEW
WAL TE L. SMmiH*
When the rent supplement program was signed into law in the fall of I965,' the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was plunged into a new field. The shift
in thrust from a moderate-income group to a low-income group demanded a changed
approach. A program designed primarily to serve families at the public housing
income level would of necessity have different imperatives than would one intended
to replace the below-market interest rate program.
I
ADMINISTRATmV Fnmlxwou
The attitude of Congress made it evident that, unless the program was placed in
operation in a very short time, funding would be extremely unlikely. Since speed
of execution was vital, a new approach to the problem of information exchange with
the field offices became necessary. To accomplish this purpose, the FHA created a
special task force, whose job it would be to put the program into motion rapidly
and efficiently. The task force personnel were drawn from all over the country, on
the basis of the central office's experience with their aptitude and their work. A
sympathetic approach to the problems of a new client group was one requirement,
and a thorough grounding in FHA methods and practices was another. An open
mind was essential, since this was precisely the field which FHA personnel had
always avoided as an undesirable mortgage risk, and which the Public Housing
Administration had made peculiarly theirs.
The task force met for the first time early in December 1965 for an intensive
two-week training session. The full resources of FHA and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development were thrown into an attempt to explain the
purposes and intent of the program to the task force members. Administrative,
underwriting, and technical problems were discussed, but the main thrust of the
training was the explanation of the intent of the program.
By the middle of December, the task force was deemed ready to begin operations.
Its members were dispersed across the country to explain to the field officers the
meaning and intent of the program, and to demonstrate the methods by which the
Department intended to demonstrate to the Congress the desire and need for the
program. Each task force member was assigned an area of the country. From that
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area, he was to bring back expressions of opinion and judgments secured from the
field.
In late December the task force again gathered in Washington to review the
results of the trip and to study the problems foreseen by the directors and chief
underwriters in the field offices. After analyzing the results of this study, the task
force returned to the field during January 1966 to obtain from the field offices
expressions of interest in the application of the program, and to help the directors
secure capable sponsors for specific proposals which could be studied.
The results of the second task force journey demonstrated conclusively that a
high level of genuine interest had been aroused by the passage of the rent supple-
ment program. Church groups all across the country saw in the program an oppor-
tunity to serve a lower income level than they had ever before been able to reach.
The FHA office was flooded with inquiries from sponsors who were interested in
building rental units. The task force was then asked to help evaluate the proposals
within the framework being considered by the FHA.
Early in the spring, a select group of experts was brought to Washington to
review the tentative rules and to judge the chances of success in various parts of
the country. This one-week meeting led to the conviction that the program could
be placed in operation within the FHA framework and could be meshed with the
other work of the field staff.
By early May, a handbook for the operation of the program had been written,2
a tentative modus operandi had been established, and the Washington headquarters
was ready to discuss the program in depth. The directors and chief underwriters
of all field offices were brought to Washington for a one-week briefing on the
prospective operation of the program. During the course of this meeting, Congress
appropriated $im million in rent supplement funds for the current fiscal year.3
The adjournment of this meeting put the program into operation. The FHA was
now ready to accept applications for rent supplement projects. In less than eight
months, a major new housing program had been thought out and placed into opera-
tion. By June 30, 1966, the $12 million dollar appropriation (except for a reserve
account) had been spoken for. The first rent supplement contract was signed in
September for a rehabilitation project in the Hough section of Cleveland, Ohio.
By late October, the task force was shaken down into an operating section of
the multifamily operation of the FHA.
II
OPERATION OF THE RENT SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM
In order to rush the rent supplement program from its initial conception to full
operation within one year, a number of problems had to be overcome. The in-
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herent nature of the program signalled a new approach to the housing problems
of the poor. Private enterprise was to be given a chance to see what it could do, in
partnership with the government, in attacking slums and poor quality housing. The
social intent of charitable and other nonprofit institutions would be put to the test.
The idea of re-housing the poor through payment by the government of a portion
of the rent on privately-built dwelling units required a new look at the problem of
economic feasibility. For the first time, an apartment house owner could have a
major portion of his rent roll guaranteed. The risk factor in mortgage insurability
is entirely changed by this one fact. So long as a supplemented tenant remains in a
dwelling unit, his supplement will be paid. The establishment of an upper supple-
ment limit (set at seventy per cent of the gross rent) meant in effect that the FHA
would collect a mortgage insurance premium on a mortgage against which it might
be making as much as seventy per cent of the payments. Under such circumstances,
it was difficult to believe that the FHA could lose. Even so, some of the top technical
experts in the agency remained convinced that the program was basically unwork-
able. Two of the major officials retired rather than face the overthrow of the
standards of risk evaluation used for other programs.
The relation of the social concept to the degree of mortgage risk revealed to the
agency its deepset distrust of people who could not "pay the freight." It required of
agency personnel a re-examination of their own training and judgment. Nothing
in the FHA experience had prepared its technical staff for firm judgments on site
selection in slum areas. Its previous management experience had been with the
middle class; it had few standards of its own to use in facing the new management
problems inherent in this program. In previous multifamily projects the agency's
work had involved definite criteria based on the mores and living habits of an
income group far above that to be served with rent supplements. Even with the
section 221(d) (3) below-market interest rate program,4 the social group served
accepted much the same standards and could, for the most part, be handled on the
same basis. The selection of FHA as the operating agency caused its members a
great amount of honest soul-searching, as the responsible field officers attempted to
understand the driving principles of housing poor people.
One positive benefit of the selection of FHA as the operating arm was that its
primary interest lay in the economics of making such an idea a working reality. The
agency was not frozen into an established pattern of acceptance of local mores,
nor was it inclined to make moral judgments on tenant acceptability. Once it was
made pellucidly clear that the FHA was not to pass judgment on the theory, but
was instead to put the theory into successful practice, the field officers went to work
on that task.
A danger seen from the beginning was that the program could very easily lead
& I2 U.S.C. § I7157(d)( 3 ) (Supp. II, 1965-66).
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to the creation of new, modern ghettos. As a first, practical step in forestalling this
problem, the FHA limited the size of any one project to 2oo units. Although arbi-
trary, and recognized as such, the informal limitation was effective in that it made
clear the intent to avoid ghettoizing the populace. The danger will exist throughout
the life of this or any other similar program.
One of the purposes of the program was to achieve a measure of economic
integration. Suburban structuring has proceeded to such a point that it is possible
for a developer to know before he starts work the exact income level which will be
attracted to his subdivision. Conversely, in low-income groups, the concentration
of economic failure has reached formidable proportions. Human nature seems to
be such that failure reinforces failure. If the rent supplement program could be
used to expose low-income families to moderate-income families, with another set
of standards, perhaps a beginning could be made toward de-structurizing that portion
of society.
The intent of Congress was expressed on this point through a "modest design"
requirement.' Individual congressmen may have felt that a modest design
standard was essential to keep the program within the client group for which it was
intended. The practical result of the criterion was to negate, at least in the beginning,
any actual attempt at vertical economic integration. One standard squeezed out of
Secretary Weaver was that no dwelling unit could contain more than one bathroom.
For a three-or-more bedroom apartment, this starts out as an undesirable unit. Air-
conditioning was forbidden, although any unit built in certain sections of the United
States without it is automatically substandard. The mortgage term that will be used
for the majority of the projects will be forty years. If any serious attempt is made
during that period to remove poverty as an important factor in American economics,
such apartments will become substandard and virtually unrentable. Rather than an
attempt to keep costs within bounds, these requirements were moral standards which
said in effect that rent supplement units should be second-class units.
For the technical sections, the establishment of cost limits and upper rent limits
was a nightmare. Every conceivable method of arriving at a useable set of cost
limits was tried and discarded. Upper rent limits were set at $85 per month for an
efficiency, $1o5 per month for a one-bedroom unit, $i2o per month for a two-bedroom
unit, and $140 per month for a unit containing three or more bedrooms. In high
cost areas, these limits could be exceeded by up to twenty-five per cent. A prag-
matic upper limit of $i75 per month for a three-or-more bedroom unit, including all
utilities except telephone, was thus created. This limit immediately removed the
possibility of large-scale new construction in New York City, Chicago, and other
major urban centers. New units simply cannot be produced in quantity in such
areas at these rent levels.
U.S. FEDERAL HOUSING ADmINISTRATION, supra note 2, at 2.
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Since the congressional delegations from the large metropolitan areas were a
major source of support, the FHA was forced into a ruling that the funds allocated
for use in conjunction with the below-market interest rate (five per cent of the total
appropriations) could be used only in those areas in which no rent supplement
project could be built without the three per cent interest rate. Most attempts to use
the joint programs for experiments in economic integration were thereby shut off.
Since rehabilitation projects are still feasible at a market interest rate in most
of the metropolitan areas, the effort in those cities had to be switched from new con-
struction to rehabilitation.
To those who were directly concerned with the implementation of the program,
the establishment of these rent levels made it clear that the program was to be used
mainly in medium-sized and smaller cities and towns where costs could be expected
to be lower. This is, indeed, what has happened.
The emphasis on participation in the program by nonprofit sponsors revised
another early concept. Historically, builders and developers managing rental units
have tried, understandably, to skim the cream off the market by accepting as tenants
only those families which could reasonably be expected to remain economically stable
and which should be relatively trouble-free. The imperative of a church group enter-
ing this program is entirely different. Such a group is primarily trying to serve
those who are purposely kept out of normal projects. Such families generally
have less stable incomes, fewer work options and hence longer periods of unemploy-
ment, and are trouble-prone. These factors showed up at once as an increase in the
anticipated rent supplement requirement per unit. Originally, the projected average
supplement was estimated at $6oo per year per unit. The eager participation of
the nonprofit sector forced this amount to an average of $i,ooo per unit per year
almost at once. This, of course, meant that fewer units could be produced under a
given appropriation than had been projected. It also meant that the program was
to be used by at least some of its sponsors for a genuinely low income group. The
relationship between a tenant's income and the amount of supplement payment is
shown in table i.
Nothing has yet appeared in the operation of the program that has caused as
much difficulty as the projected management problems of these projects. Estimates
of the probable cost of managing a rent supplement project vary so widely as to be
ridiculous. Judgments about tenant relations as a management problem have actually
kept some sponsors out of the program. The FHA's experience has been with the
landlord class; in many cases it has seemed to adopt the landlord's attitude toward
low-income tenants. It is extraordinarily difficult to convince a property manage-
ment officer (who is fully aware of his troubles with middle-income tenants) that a
rent supplement tenant could under any circumstances be anything but a problem.
A guidebook to effective management has been prepared by the FHA and distributed
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TABLE I
TENANT INCOME AND SUPPLEMENT PAYMENTS
O-Bedroom 1-Bedroom 2-Bedroom 3-or-more
Gross Rent $85 $105 $120 Bedroom $140
Tenant Supple- Tenant Supple- Tenant Supple- Tenant Supple-
Tenant Income Rent ment Rent ment Rent ment Rent ment
$1200 ................. 25 60
1300 ................. 27 58
1400 ................. 29 56
1500 ................. 31 54 31 74
1600 ................. 33 52 33 72
1700 ................. 35 50 35 70
1800 ................. 38 47 38 67 38 82
1900 ................. 40 45 40 65 40 80
2000 ................. 42 43 42 63 42 78 42 98
2100 ................. 44 41 44 61 44 76 44 96
2200 ................. 46 39 46 59 46 74 46 94
2300 ................. 48 37 48 57 48 72 48 92
2400 ................. 50 35 50 55 50 70 50 90
2500 ................. 52 33 52 53 52 68 52 88
2600 ................. 54 31 54 51 54 66 54 86
2700 ................. 56 29 56 49 56 64 56 84
2800 ................. 58 27 58 47 58 62 58 82
2900 ................. 60 25 60 45 60 60 60 80
3000 ................. 63 22 63 42 63 57 63 77
3100 ................. 65 20 65 40 65 55 65 75
3200 ................. 67 18 67 38 67 53 67 73
3300 ................. 69 16 69 36 69 51 69 71
3400 ................. 71 14 71 34 71 49 71 69
3500 ................. 73 12 73 32 73 47 73 67
3600 ................. 75 10 75 30 75 45 75 65
3700 ................. 77 8 77 28 77 43 77 63
3800 ................. 79 26 79 41 79 61
3900 ................. 81 24 81 39 81 59
4000 ................. 83 22 83 37 83 57
4100 ................. 85 20 85 35 85 55
4200 ................. 88 17 88 32 88 52
4300 ................. 90 15 90 30 90 50
4400 ................. 92 13 92 28 92 48
4500 ................. 94 11 94 26 94 46
4600 ................. 96 24 96 44
4700 ................. 98 22 98 42
4800 ................. 100 20 100 40
4900 ................. 102 18 102 38
5000 ................. 104 16 104 36
5100 ................. 106 14 106 34
5200 ................. 108 12 108 32
5300 ................. 110 30
5400 ................. 113 27
5500 ................. 115 25
5600 ................. 117 23
5700 ................. 119 21
5800 ................. 121 19
5900 ................. 123 17
6000 ................. 125 15
to its offices,' but it is likely that only experience will teach the sponsors, the owners,
and the FHA the proper blend of supportive services and hard-nosed management
IU.S. FEDERAL HOUSING ADmINISTRATION, DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, RENT
SUPPLEMENT PROGRAMA PROJECT MANAGEMENT OUTLINE (I967).
488 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
practices. The efforts of one organization are illustrated in the appendix that follows
this article.
CONCLUSION
Within the next few years, enough projects will be finished so that a pattern
may be established. Some facets of the program need revision, but in many parts
of the country rent supplements seem a promising answer to low-income housing
problems. It is beyond doubt the most widely misunderstood housing program
ever put into effect. Its greatest usefulness at this moment is in the southeast and
southern middle western regions; yet this is the area of most determined congressional
opposition to the concept. In North Carolina, for example, a statewide Low Income
Housing Development Corporation has been established by the North Carolina
Fund.' It is using the rent supplement program under nonprofit sponsorship as its
major instrument, and is finding that the tool fits the job; yet the North Carolina
congressional delegation votes as a bloc to kill the program.
As experience with the rent supplement program grows-and it must grow, since
the appropriations already made commit the government to support of the existing
program for up to forty years-and misunderstandings about its purposes and methods
lessen, it is likely to become the keystone of the effort to re-house the poor.
APPENDIX
I
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR RALEIGH INTER-CHuRCH HOUSING, INC.
I. Professional management. RICH will hire, for day-to-day management of the
project, a competent, experienced real estate firm.
2. Resident manager. RICH will include in its project at least one rental unit
which shall be reserved for a resident manager.
3. Property maintenance. RICH will form, within the sponsoring group itself, a
property maintenance committee. This committee shall be responsible to the
sponsor for the upkeep and appearance of the project.
4. Tenant selection. RICH will form, within the sponsoring group itself, a tenant
selection committee. This committee shall be responsible for the determination
of tenant selection, in accordance with the requirements of the FHA and the
policies of the sponsoring group. It shall make, or cause to be made, an investiga-
tion of the income, assets, family size and composition, of each prospective
tenant. It shall make a determination for the sponsor of the required amount
The corporation is now completely independent.
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of supplement for each tenant, and shall furnish to the management firm a
completed application form for each tenant.
5. Social support and assistance. RICH will form, within the sponsoring group, a
committee (which shall include representatives from all churches involved)
which shall be responsible for making available to the tenants and to the project
any and all socially supportive services needed or desired to assist the tenants.
The information secured by the tenant selection committee shall be made avail-
able to the tenant assistance committee.
6. Financial management. RICH will form, within the sponsoring group, a financial
committee which shall be responsible to all concerned for the management of
residual receipts, replacement reserves, maintenance and decorating reserves;
mortgage management; rent supplement funds computations and management;
loans and grants.
7. Tenant advisory committee. RICH shall form a tenant advisory cormimittee,
which shall be responsible for giving the tenants financial and credit advice, job
opportunity information, and other information and advice.
8. Steering committee. The chairman of each of the above committees shall also
serve as a member of a steering committee which shall coordinate implementa-
tation of the policies of the board of directors, and which shall recommend'
policies and policy changes to the board of directors. This committee shall
contain representatives of the tenants.
9. Open occupancy. No policy determination may be made by RICH or any of
its constituent bodies or agents which contravenes the occupancy policies of FHA.
io. Tenant privacy. RICH will prohibit its members, constituent bodies, and agents
from making public, inside or outside the project, the financial situation or
supplement requirements of any tenant.
II
ORGANIZATION OF RALEIGH INTER-CHURCH HousrNG, INC.
Board of DirectorsI
Executive Committee
Manager Steering Committee
I I I
Property Tenant Social and Financial Tenant
Maintenance Selection Supportive Committee Advisory
Service Committee
Committee
